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The aim of this article is to offer a comparative analysis of the revolutionary dis-
solution of the Russian and the Austro-Hungarian Empires, and also to study 
the process of revolution-counter-revolution, in particular, the origins, classifica-
tion, and results of the monarchist counter-revolution witnessed in the territories 
of the former Empires. The monarchist counter-revolution in Central and East-
ern Europe emerged in these countries (Russia, Hungary, Finland) precisely 
as a response to Soviet power and Bolshevism, as an ideology and political prac-
tice. It would not have had a serious basis during the democratic republican peri-
od of the revolution that preceded Bolshevism. The factors involved in the emer-
gence of a monarchist counter-revolution include the following: the existence 
of strong monarchist traditions in society, the presence of charismatic military 
and political leaders who professed monarchical views (for example, Lieutenant-
General Baron Carl Gustaf Emil Mannerheim in Finland, Lieutenant-General 
Pavlo Skoropadsky in Ukraine, Major-General Pyotr Krasnov in the Don, Vice-
Admiral Alexander Kolchak in Russia, Vice-Admiral Miklós Horthy in Hunga-
ry), and, finally, international military and diplomatic support from neighbor-
ing monarchies, for instance, the German Empire and the Kingdom of Sweden 
in the case of Finland, the German Empire and the Austro-Hungarian Empire 
in the cases of Ukraine and Don, and we can also consider, in a certain sense, 
the Kingdom of Romania in the case of Hungary. The monarchist counter-revo-
lution developed at the periphery of each state (for example, in Finland, it was in 
Vaasa, in Hungary – Szeged, in Russia – Omsk), since the capitals were captured 
by the Bolsheviks. Admittedly, the monarchist counter-revolution was defeated 
in Russia, but, in Finland and Hungary, its victory had only a provisional char-
acter, since both Kingdoms existed without their kings due to Allied pressure.
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Проводится сравнительный анализ распада Российской и  Австро-Вен-
герской империй и  роли революции и  контрреволюции на  территориях 
бывших империй. Выявляются причины возникновения и классификация 
монархической контрреволюции, а  также анализируются ее результаты. 
Монархическая контрреволюция в Центральной и Восточной Европе воз-
никла именно как реакция на советскую власть и большевизм как идео-
логию и политическую практику. Она не имела бы серьезной основы для 
появления в республиканский демократический период революции, пред-
шествовавший большевизму. Факторами монархической контрреволюции 
были соответствующие традиции в  обществе, наличие харизматичных 
военно-политических лидеров, исповедовавших монархические взгляды 
(генерал-лейтенант барон Карл Густав Маннергейм в Финляндии, генерал-
лейтенант Павел Скоропадский в Украине, генерал-майор Петр Краснов 
на Дону, вице-адмирал Александр Колчак в России, вице-адмирал Миклош 
Хорти в Венгрии), и, наконец, международная военная и дипломатическая 
поддержка со  стороны соседних монархий (Германии и  Швеции  –   Фин-
ляндии, Германии и Австро-Венгрии –   Украине и Дону, Румынии –   Вен-
грии). Монархическая контрреволюция возникла на окраинах государств 
(Финляндии –   в Ваасе, Венгрии –   в Сегеде, России –   в Омске), посколь-
ку столицы были захвачены большевиками. Она потерпела поражение 
в России, а в Финляндии и Венгрии одержала лишь временную победу, по-
скольку оба королевства существовали без короля по причине давления 
со стороны союзников.
Ключевые слова: распад империй; монархическая контрреволюция; боль-
шевизм; история Финляндии; история Венгрии; история Украины; исто-
рия России.
The First World War led to radical geopolitical transformation in Cen-
tral and Eastern Europe resulting from the dissolution of the Russian and 
the Austro-Hungarian Empires, which was accompanied by social revo-
lution (as  each monarchy was replaced by republican rule) and the self-
determination of nations amid the dictates of the winners.
Even though monarchical rule dominated in Europe before the First 
World War, most newly independent states that emerged in Central and 
Eastern Europe as a result of the collapse of Russia and Austria-Hunga-
ry chose republican rule. As Sir Halford Mackinder highlighted, the First 
World War was a fight between conservative empires and democratic na-
tions [Mackinder]. Indeed, while Germany had dominated Central and 
Eastern Europe (beginning with the Berlin Congress of 1878 and until the 
Brest-Litovsk treaty of 1918), monarchy was the main form of government 
of newly independent states in the region. After the victory of the Allied 
powers in the First World War, the situation changed radically and republi-
can rule became widespread.
However, in the cases of Russia and Austria-Hungary, the dynasty con-
tradicted the nation, i.  e., their dynastic statehood prevented the princi-
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ple of national sovereignty inside the country and the national unification 
of neighboring states. For example, the existence of the Austro-Hungarian 
Empire delayed the finalization of the process of national unification for 
Germany, Italy, and Romania (which was reflected in the Romanian proc-
lamation of a state of war against Austro-Hungary on 27 August 1916), and 
also the independence of Hungary, Czechia, and Croatia. Thus, as Oskar 
Jászi has pointed out, the process of the dissolution of the Austro-Hungari-
an monarchy was as natural as the process of state integration of European 
countries, such as Germany, Italy, Romania:
The same fundamental causes working for unity in the nationally ho-
mogeneous states worked toward dissolution in the ethnographical mosaic 
of the Habsburg Empire [Jászi, 1964, p. 7].
And, in this case, Ignác Romsics has emphasized that the irredentist 
goals of Romania, Serbia, and Italy caused the state breakdown of Austro-
Hungary [Romsics, p. 51].
The Russian Empire, as a dynastic statehood, also hampered the in-
dependence of non-Russian nations, such as Finland, Poland, Lithuania, 
Georgia, Armenia, etc. Indeed, the existence of the Russian and Austro-
Hungarian Empires produced states of divided nations, such as Poles, 
Ukrainians, Romanians, etc. Furthermore, the rivalry between Germany 
and Austria-Hungary, on the one hand, and Russia, on the other hand, 
caused state instability in Central and Eastern Europe and led to the First 
World War.
Not only Germany but also France and Great Britain strived for domi-
nance in Central and Eastern Europe. European powers considered Austro-
Hungary as a bulwark against Russian expansion towards the Balkans but 
Russia as a counterbalance to Germany and Austro-Hungary [Romsics, p. 44; 
Stadler, p. 178]. Nevertheless, during the war, the Allies came to believe that 
the power vacuum created by the collapse of Russia and Austria-Hungary 
should be filled by new nation-states in Central and Eastern Europe, oriented 
to Great Britain and France to prevent German and Russian influence in the 
region [Romsics, p. 30–31, 44; Bideleux, Jeffries, p. 322–323]. In this case, 
Halford Mackinder proposed to separate Germany and Russia by means 
of the establishment of a Middle Tier of newly independent states that 
emerged in the former Russian and Austro-Hungarian Empires (Lithuania, 
Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary) [Mackinder, p. 196–198].
Germany’s aim in the First World War was to separate Russia from Eu-
rope through a belt of buffer states [Fischer, p. 376–377, 456–472, 479–487, 
509, 534–562]: Finland, Lithuania, Poland, Ukraine, Georgia, i. e., to return 
Russia to its pre-Peter the Great boundaries of the “Moscow Grand Duke-
dom” [Сазонов, c. 273; Туполев, c. 53]. In 1915, Paul von Rohrbach wrote 
that according to the interests of European security, the Russian Empire 
must be broken up into several territories to reduce the threat of the “Rus-
sian Menace” attacking Central Europe. In this manner, Germany should 
sponsor the independence of Finland, Poland, and Ukraine [Meyer, p. 63–
64; фон Рорбах, c. 88, 106].
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Thus, the German aim was to minimize Russian influence in the Bal-
tic region and to block it from accessing the Balkan, the Black Sea Region, 
and Asia Minor. This plan was realized after the Brest-Litovsk peace agree-
ment: Russia was separated from Germany by Lithuania and Ukraine, and 
also from the Black Sea by Ukraine and the so-called South-Eastern Union 
of Cossack Hosts and Caucasus nations. The new buffer states such as the 
Kingdom of Finland, the Kingdom of Lithuania, and the Baltic Grand Duchy 
were bound to Germany by dynastic ties. Ukraine retained a republican gov-
ernment, because of the clash of interests between the German and Austro-
Hungarian Empires. Since the latter tried to establish the Habsburg dynasty 
in Kiev (Archduke Wilhelm Habsburg), Germany, therefore, insisted on the 
establishment of Hetman rule as a historical form of government in Ukraine.
The defeat of the Russian Empire in the Great War would not have auto-
matically led to its total disintegration, but only to certain territorial losses 
in Eastern Europe, and the deprivation of its imperial status. As in the case 
of Austria-Hungary, the satisfaction of the territorial demands of Romania, 
Serbia, and Italy would not have automatically meant the collapse of the 
Empire, without the Entente powers insisting on the total disintegration 
of the Dual Monarchy [Romsics, p. 31, 33–36, 44]. Most historians have pre-
viously argued that the dissolution of Austro-Hungary was inevitable, and 
its military defeat in the First World War only accelerated a process started 
by the Hungarian Revolution of 1848 and the Austro-Hungarian agreement 
of 1867, and furthered by the annexation of Bosnia and Hercegovina in 1908 
[Stadler; Sked, 1981; Mason; Lieven, p. 177–198; Sked, 2001].
Thus, two of the most important factors in the downfall of these em-
pires are as follows: an external one (the First World War and irreden-
tism of the neighboring nation-states), and an internal one (secessionism 
of the incorporated nations). Meanwhile, the First World War was only 
the background that accelerated the process of their dissolution, fol-
lowed by social revolution2.
The revolutionary processes in Russia and Austria-Hungary had some 
differences. First and foremost was the issue of abdication. In Russia, on 
2  (15) March 1917, Nicholas II signed the Manifesto of abdication with-
out the resolution of the Senate (the Supreme Court) and the Russian Par-
liament, i. e., in violation of the Constitution of 1906 (Articles 7, 26, 49) 
[Основные государственные законы, c. 457–459]. Meanwhile, in Aus-
tria-Hungary, Karl I did not abdicate the throne, he only refused to partici-
pate in public affairs of Austria by the Declaration of 11 November 1918 
[Rauchensteiner, p. 993–1002, 1005; Шимов, c. 565] and also in Hungary 
by the Declaration of 13 November 1918. The absence of the formal ab-
dication of the Emperor of Austria and King of Hungary created the op-
portunity for the restoration of the monarchy in Hungary. Even in Russia, 
it was still possible after the assassination of Nicholas II by the Bolsheviks, 
2 An overview of the modern discussion on the Russian revolution see: [Поршнева, 
Ульянова].
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since some of the Romanovs, for instance, Grand Duke Pavel (an  uncle 
of Nicholas II), Grand Duke Nicholas (an uncle of Nicholas II and the former 
Commander-in-chief of Russian Imperial Army), and Grand Duke Kyrill 
(a cousin of Nicholas II) could have inherited the Russian throne.
Hereafter was the proclamation of the republic. In Russia, it was a decision 
by the Provisional Government (not by parliament) on 1 (14) September 1917, 
ahead of the convening of the Constituent Assembly. In Austria-Hungary, 
by contrast, legislative bodies continued to work and made the declarations on 
this issue: Austria on 12 November 1918, and Hungary on 16 November 1918.
The disintegration of Austria-Hungary occurred very quickly, even before 
the proclamation of Austria and Hungary as republics. De facto it started 
on 28 October 1918 (the declaration of independence of Czechoslovakia), 
and, on 1 November 1918, the Empire was completely dissolved. Meanwhile, 
the process of the disintegration of the Russian Empire took a longer period 
(March –  November 1917) and developed according to Miroslav Hroch’s pat-
tern, i. e., national mobilization –  autonomy –  the independent state [Hroch, 
p. 22–23, 26–28, 178–185]. For instance, in March 1917, the Provisional 
Government recognized the independence of Poland [Wandycz, p. 199] and 
autonomy of Estonia and Latvia [Церетели, c. 77], but other national issues, 
including the independence of Finland, were postponed until the Constitu-
ent Assembly. It should also be noted that the motto of the Russian revolution 
was “Russia is Federative and Democratic!”, and the Constituent Assembly 
proclaimed Russia as a so-called Democratic Federative Republic, though this 
did not stop any centrifugal tendencies. So, Maurice Paléologue remarked:
Finland, Livland, Estland, Poland, Lithuania, Ukraine, Georgia, Siberia 
demand independence, or at least complete autonomy. That Russia is doomed 
to federalism, it is likely… But the current movement is far more secessionist 
than regional, more secessionist than federalist; it seeks neither more nor less 
as a national breakdown… The French Revolution began with the declaration 
of the Republic of one and indivisible. The Russian Revolution is taking 
a slogan: Russia is divided and fragmented [Палеолог, c. 402–403].
However, the dissolution culminated after the Bolshevik coup d’état and 
was caused not only by the Declaration of the Rights of the Peoples of Russia, 
issued by the Bolshevik government (the Council of People’s Commissars) 
on 2(15) November 1917, but also by the Bolshevik anti-human ideology 
and political practice. Indeed, it was the result of an exodus of nations 
from Bolshevism [Pipes, p. 514–515; Булдаков, c. 417]. Generally, during 
1918–1919, the collapse of both the above-mentioned Empires led to the 
formation of 33 new states on the territory of the former Russian Empire 
(January 1918) [Pipes, p. 514–515].
The Bolsheviks’ main goal was to destroy all nation-states and create the 
World Soviet Republic [Декреты Советской власти, т. 1, с. 40; Милюков, 
1925, c. 185–187] through the so-called “export of the revolution” or the 
“triumphal march of Soviet power” from the center (Russia) to the neighbors: 
Finland (27 January 1918), Ukraine (9 February 1918, 14 March, and 
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14 December 1919), Latvia (6 January and 17 December 1918). Moreover, 
the establishment of Soviet power in Hungary on 21 March 1919 became 
a further stimulus for the spread of Bolshevism, for instance, on 7 April 1919, 
the Bavarian Soviet Republic was proclaimed. The Bolsheviks established 
the Third (Communist) International, as Pavel Milyukov remarked, 
“as a preliminary measure to conquest the world” [Miliukov, p. 8].
The counter-revolution in Russia, Finland, and Hungary emerged on the 
periphery of these states, as a counterbalance to their revolutionary capitals, 
and as a response to the Bolshevik regime. For example, since the Bolsheviks 
controlled the capitals (Petrograd in Russia, Helsinki in Finland, Budapest 
in Hungary), then the Headquarters of the White governments were located 
in Vaasa in Finland; Szeged in Hungary; Samara, Ufa and then Omsk in Russia, 
etc. In the Russian case, there was the central White government in Omsk, 
in addition to local ones in Arkhangelsk (the Northern government), Pskov 
(the North-Western government), and Taganrog (the Government of South 
Russia). According to Pavel Milyukov’s conception, the counter-revolution 
had two periods: the preparation and the struggle, i.  e., the latent and the 
active phases [Милюков, 1927, с. 4]. However, it is more accurate to state 
that there were three stages of counter-revolution: the emergence, the struggle 
(Civil War), and, according to its result, either the restoration (Finland and 
Hungary) or the defeat (Russia). In Sergei Melgunov’s opinion, the reason 
for the defeat of counter-revolution was determined by the geographical 
factor. The Bolsheviks occupied the industrial centre while the Whites were 
concentrated and developed on the peripheries [Мельгунов, c. 16].
Тhe success of the counter-revolution was closely linked to international 
support and, in particular, Anti-Bolshevik intervention. For example, 
Oszkár Jászi pointed out that the counter-revolution was in reply to the 
dictatorship of the proletariat and moral dissolution in society under 
Bolshevik leadership, but the Hungarian counter-revolution took the 
opportunity to liberate the country only simultaneously with Romanian 
intervention [Jászi, 1969, p. 153]. However, in István Deák’s view, the 
Bolshevik regime was defeated by a popular nation-wide counter-revolution, 
and the Romanian intervention only accelerated this process [Deák, 129–
140]. The role of German intervention in Finland in 1918 is still open to 
debate too. For instance, most Finnish historians believe that German 
intervention played a certain, though not decisive, role in the liberation 
of Finland from the Reds. German aid only accelerated the end of the war, 
because, after the Brest-Litovsk peace treaty, the Russian Bolsheviks were 
keen to avoid any direct military confrontation with German forces in the 
country [Jussila, Hentila, Nevakivi, p. 119; Puntila, p, 109].
Most contemporary Russian and Ukrainian historians consider the 
counter-revolution in Russia as a single phenomenon, without dividing it into 
monarchist and republican components. The very term Monarchist counter-
revolution was invented by Leon Trotsky and, initially, it had a pejorative 
meaning concerning some prominent Russian Whites leaders (Admiral 
Alexander Kolchak, General Nikolai Yudenich, General Eugene Miller) 
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[Троцкий, с.  68]. Valentina Zimina and Yuri Grazhdanov used the term 
Germanophil Monarchist Counter-revolution to define the restoration regimes 
in the Ukrainian State, the Almighty Don Host, the Crimea, and the Baltic 
Grand Duchy in 1918 [Зимина; Гражданов, Зимина]. Indeed, there were two 
types of the Russian monarchist movement of 1918 after the Brest-Litovsk peace 
treaty: a Germanophil, which tried attempted to restore the monarchy in Russia 
through the German political and military support (for example, General Pyotr 
Krasnov, Prince Anatol von Liven, Duke Nicholas von Leuchtenberg, etc.) and 
a pro-Entente, one which relied on the Allies (for example, such as Generals 
Eugene Miller and Nikolai Yudenich, Admiral Alexander Kolchak, etc.).
The monarchist counter-revolution in Central and Eastern Europe (1918–
1920) should be classified into three types. The first type was classical dynastic 
royalism, which meant the restoration of the overthrown dynasty. Such 
a type was widely represented among the Russian Whites (General Nikolai 
Yudenich, General Eugene Miller, Duke Nicholas von Leuchtenberg, Prince 
Anatol von Liven, Prince Pavel Bermondt-Avalov, etc.) The second type was 
national royalism, as an attempt to unite loyalty to the nation and loyalty to the 
throne, i. e. the establishment of a national monarchy (Admiral Miklós Horthy 
de Nagybánya in Hungary, Pehr Evind Svinhufvud af Qvalstad in Finland, 
Admiral Alexander Kolchak in Russia). And, the third type, conditionally 
called export-monarchism (i.  e., export-counter-revolution), was the desire 
of the leadership of new states (it did not matter the monarchical or republican 
form of government) to liquidate Bolshevism and to restore the monarchy 
i Russia as a mean ensuring the security and independence of one’s own state 
(Baron Carl Gustaf Emil Mannerheim, the Regent of the Kingdom of Finland; 
Pavlo Skoropadsky, the Hetman of the Ukrainian State; Pyotr Krasnov, the 
Ataman of the Almighty Don Horst) [Маннергейм, c. 177–178; Скоропад-
ский, с. 11, 13, 15, 17, 27–28, 105–106; Краснов, с. 193].
The factors involved in the emergence of monarchical counter-
revolution were, thus:
– Monarchical traditions. For instance, Finns, Lithuanians, Hungarians, 
and Russians had a long historical experience of monarchical statehood.
–  Charismatic political and military leaders of new states who profess 
monarchical views, for example, Lieutenant-General Baron Carl Gustaf 
Emil Mannerheim in Finland, Lieutenant-General Pavlo Skoropadsky in 
Ukraine, Major-General Pyotr Krasnov in Don, Vice-Admiral Alexander 
Kolchak in Russia, Vice-Admiral Miklós Horthy in Hungary. Baron Carl 
Gustaf Emil Mannerheim was elected as a Regent of the Kingdom of Finland 
on 12 December 1918, after the abdication of King Frederich Karl [Ман-
нергейм, c. 142–143, 145–147, 151; Jussila, Hentila, Nevakivi, p. 124–125; 
Puntila, p. 112–113]. Miklós Horthy was elected as a Regent of the Kingdom 
of Hungary by the National Assembly on 1 March 1920, after the evacuation 
of Romanian troops from Hungary [Horthy, p. 130–131; Szilassy, p. 71].
– International support from neighbouring monarchies was conducted 
through the intervention of diplomatic, or military-technical support. For 
example, in the Russian case, holding advantageous positions near Viborg 
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and Narva, the German troops could have taken Petrograd and overthrown 
the Bolshevik power in Russia, but because of intensive battle activity on 
the Western Front, the German political establishment decided to provide 
only military-technical and diplomatic support to the Russian monarchists 
under the condition of their abidance of the terms of the Brest-Litovsk peace 
treaty [von der Goltz, s. 48, 91–92; фон Куль, Дельбрюк, c. 50, 52–54].
Supporting Russian monarchist groups, Graf Wilhelm von Mirbach-Harff, 
the German Ambassador to Russia, believed that Germany should thereby 
eliminate or minimize the influence of the Entente on the Russian counter-
revolution. He planned the Anti-Bolshevik conspiracy in Moscow through 
a secret monarchist counter-revolutionary organization (“the Right Centre”) 
led by Active Privy Councillor, Alexander Krivoshein, and Alexander Trepov, 
the former Prime-Minister of the Russian Empire [Документы Германского 
посла в Москве, c. 121–125, 127–129]. Presumably, the assassination of Graf 
Wilhelm von Mirbach-Harff in Moscow, committed by agents of the Cheka, 
was a preventive action by the Bolshevik government to foil Germany’s plans. 
Even though the assassination of the Ambassador was a potential casus belli, 
Germany did not declare war on Soviet Russia, and merely closed its Embassy 
in Moscow, retaining only its Consulate General in Petrograd.
International support imposed certain obligations and limitations on 
independent foreign policy activity. For example, after signing an additional 
protocol to the Brest-Litovsk agreement on 27 August 1918, Germany 
prevented the Kingdom of Finland from attacking Petrograd.
Some new states such as Finland, Ukraine, Don, Estonia, became bases 
for the monarchist counter-revolution in Russia [Ахтамзян, с. 99–100, 125, 
139, 159; Германская восточная политика, с. 137; Kirby, p. 56; Документы 
германского посла в Москве, c. 126; Зайцов, c. 130, 132, 140, 148; Kenez, 
p. 135, 140, 147, 162, 219–220, 238–240, 272]. Their leaders believed that 
the liquidation of Bolshevism’s threat and the restoration of the monarchy in 
Russia was the basis of a return to normal international relations, and would 
secure the territorial integrity and security of the new states [Маннергейм, 
c. 177–178; Мери, c. 118–119, 124–126, 128; Краснов, с. 215–216, 218, 220–
223; Россия и Украина, c. 259; Скоропадский, с. 11, 13, 15, 17, 27–28, 105–
106]. As it turned out, this goal was not realized due to the uncompromising 
position of the Russian White government (Supreme Ruler Admiral Alexander 
Kolchak) regarding its recognition of the newly independent states (Finland 
and Estonia) and the delimitation of new frontiers [Колчак и Финляндия, 
c. 87, 93, 97–98, 100, 113–114, 117, 119–121, 135, 137–140]. It was Admiral 
Alexander Kolchak’s uncompromising position that caused the Finnish and 
Estonian troops to stop their involvement in the advance towards Petrograd, 
which allowed the Reds to defeat General Yudenich. As Ernest von Wahl 
noted, the Russian White Forces lost the Civil War against Bolshevism because 
of their unwillingness to recognize the new political reality after the collapse 
of the Russian Empire [фон Валь, 1937, c. 12, 41, 54, 56].
The defeat of the monarchist counter-revolution in Russia was related 
to the defeat of Germany in the First World War. According to Arseny Zajtsov, 
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11 November 1918 was “the mourning day of the Russian counter-revolution”, 
since “the Armistice Day did not become the beginning of the world struggle 
against Bolshevism” [Зайцов, c. 333–334]. Pavel Milyukov also drew attention 
to the fact that the victory of the Entente did not provide the Whites with the 
opportunity to defeat the Reds in Russia [Милюков, 1927, c. 16, 75].
Germany and Finland failed to restore the monarchy in Russia, while 
the restoration of the monarchy in Hungary took place due to the victory 
of the Romanian army over the Hungarian Reds, since the Hungarian 
White troops were too weak to operate independently against them 
[Bernard, Kliment, p. 32, 34; Preda, Prodan, p. 148, 156–157; Ormos, 
p. 244–252, 309–310, 354–355; Romsics, p. 110–111]. However, after the 
Reds’ collapse, the western and southern parts of the country were liberated 
by the Hungarian White Army, under the command of Vice-Admiral 
Miklós Horthy [Szilassy, p. 66; de Daruvar, p. 79].
In the summer of 1919, Archduke Joseph August proclaimed himself 
as a regent of the Kingdom of Hungary but was forced to abdicate after 
only two weeks. The Allies would not recognize him, as he represented the 
Habsburgs [Ormos, p. 334, 339, 343–344, 372]. Finally, faced by the strong 
opposition of the Entente to seeing the legitimate Hungarian sovereign, 
King Karl IV, restored to his throne, on 1 March 1920, the National 
Assembly elected Vice-Admiral Miklós Horthy, the Commander-in-chief 
of the Hungarian National Army, as a Regent of the Kingdom of Hungary 
[de Daruvar, p. 79]. In March and October 1921, Karl’s attempts to regain 
the throne in Budapest were rejected by Horthy’s government, which was 
conscious of the real threat of intervention by the Allies. Thus, due to Allied 
pressure, the Kingdom of Hungary now existed without a king.
The downfall of the Russian and Austro-Hungarian Empires occurred 
because of their dynastic statehood. The First World War was only the 
background and the accelerator of this process, accompanied by social 
revolution, which led to the establishment of the Bolshevik regime in Russia 
and Hungary, as a new challenge to the international order.
Generally, monarchist counter-revolution in the new states of these 
former empires did not emerge immediately after the downfall of their 
monarchies and the establishment of republican rule, but only subsequently, 
as a response to Bolshevism.
Finally, monarchist counter-revolution was victorious in Finland 
and Hungary thanks to the monarchical political tradition of society, 
charismatic leaders, and international support, but was defeated in Russia, 
due to a lack of international support and the unwillingness of the Russian 
Whites’ government to recognize newly independent states. As Ernest von 
Wahl stressed, only an alliance of the new nations, which emerged after 
the imperial breakdown, would have destroyed the Bolshevik regime [фон 
Валь, с. 8–10, 12, 43, 48, 52, 54–56].
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